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WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE AMERICAN BANKING
SYSTEM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE*
MARY

S.

HEAD**

Many of the problems which currently plague the American
banking system bear a striking resemblance to the financial
excesses and abuses of the late 1920's and the early 1930's which
resulted in the economic collapse of that period. The lack of effective
bank regulation, the increasing expansion of banks into nonbanking
activities, and the rapid growth of bank holding companies are
developments which produced catastrophe in an earlier day and
which threaten to produce similar results today if current trends in
banking continue unchecked.
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the stability of
the American banking system, already weakened by a wave of
financial crises which began in 1869, was further jeopardized by the
large-scale entry of banks into nonbanking enterprises, notably the
sale of securities. In the absence of an effective bank regulatory
mechanism, the bankers' wild speculation on the stock market,
coupled with the execution of high-interest foreign loans, ultimately
led to the stock market crash of 1929 and the economic unrest which
continued into the 1930's. Despite the passage of the Federal Reserve
Act in 1913,1 which was designed to wrest control of the banking
system from the bankers, the Federal Reserve System quickly
became dominated by banking interests which proved unable to put
the stability of the banking system before their own immediate selfinterest.
The same trend towards expansion of banks into nonbanking
activity - leasing, mortgage banking, commercial factoring, and
consumer finance - is evident today. With little attempt on the part
of the Federal Reserve Board to limit this trend, it appears inevitable
that, unless needed reforms are carried out, the banking system will
face continued instability and eventual collapse.
It is the purpose of this article to explore today's problems in the
field of banking in light of the experience of the 1920's and 1930's in
an effort to underscore the seriousness of the present situation and to
* B.A. 1924, LL.B. 1926, Cornell University; Professor Emeritus of Law.
Catholic University. From 1973 to 1976, Professor Keeffe studied the banking system
for the late Wright Patman, chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. This article
is an outgrowth of that study. Professor Keeffe joins the faculty of the Potomac School

of Law in Washington D.C. in 1977-1978.
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point the way toward effective solutions to these problems. The
article will focus first on existing organizational and operational
defects of the Federal Reserve System, and then will turn to an
examination of the bank holding company structure, the Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) industry, and the problem of foreign
lending to less developed countries.
I.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

After more than fifty years in existence, the Federal Reserve
System stands clearly in need of restructuring. 2 Two aspects of the
operation of the Federal Reserve System require immediate reform.
First, the conflict of interest inherent in the entire system,
institutionalized in the composition of the Boards of Directors of the
regional Federal Reserve Banks, has led to the domination of the
Federal Reserve System by local banking interests and the
formulation of policies favorable to those interests. Secondly, the
Fed's jealously guarded "independence," its freedom from Presidential or Congressional influence in the formulation of monetary
policy, has become not only an anachronism, but an obstacle to
responsible monetary policy-making in a difficult economic period
when close cooperation among all branches of government is
required to achieve economic goals. In view of the dramatic impact
which the Fed's monetary decisions have on "prices, the value of
money, foreign exchange rates, interest rates, economic activity, and
employment and unemployment," 3 the Fed's insistence on conducting its operations in total secrecy must be rejected. The Federal
Reserve System must be made more responsive to the President,
Congress, and the public.
Moreover, the organizational and operational defects of the
Federal Reserve System have allowed the problems of bank holding
company activity, the REIT industry, and foreign loans to become
more serious. Due to the System's domination by banking interests,
the Fed had presented no opposition to the -often short-sighted
wishes of the banking community, thus worsening an already
deteriorating situation.
The organizational shortcomings of the Federal Reserve System,
as the conflict of interest situations which pervade it, are
well
as
2. The Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 by. the Federal Reserve Act,
38 Stat. 251, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1970). It consists of the Board of
Governors, twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Open Market
Committee, the Federal Advisory Council, and 5,790 privately-owned commercial
member banks. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Reuss v. Balles, Civil No. 76-1142 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 1976).
3. Complaint at 6, Reuss v. Balles, Civil No. 76-1142 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 1976).
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illustrated in the following discussion of the length of office of Board
members, the Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board, the
structure of the regional Federal Reserve Banks, the operation of the
Federal Open Market Committee, and the present division of
responsibility for bank examination among the three banking
agencies.
A. Length of Term of Office of Board Members
As enacted in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act called for the
formation of a Federal Reserve Board of seven members. 4 Two
members were to be ex-officio, the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Comptroller of the Currency, while the other five were to be
appointed by the President for staggered ten-year terms. 5 Not more
than one of the -five members was to reside in any one Federal
Reserve district, and two were to be experienced in banking.6 In
selecting Board members, the President was cautioned to have due
regard for a fair representation of the various financial, agricultural,
industrial and geographic sectors of the nation. 7 Finally, none of the
five Board members were permitted to hold any office, position or
employment in a member bank while in office or for two years
thereafter.8 In 1935, the Act was amended to remove both the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency from
the Board and to allow the President to appoint all seven Board
members for staggered fourteen year terms. 9
In such a sensitive and changing area as monetary control, the
lengthy terms of Federal Reserve Board members serve to insulate
the Board from economic and political realities and enable the Board
to design and implement monetary policy with little regard for
Administration or Congressional goals. Unless members die or
resign, it is impossible for a newly-elected President to name more
than two members to the Board during his first term and more than
three members before the end of his second term. Although the
lengthy terms were designed to prevent Presidential control of the
Board, 10 modem economic conditions dictate close communication
and cooperation between the Board and the executive and legislative
branches to achieve economic goals. Thus, the first step in making
4. Act of December 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 260.
5. Id.
6. Id. The provision requiring two Board members to be experienced in banking
was eliminated in 1922. Act of June 3, 1922, ch. 205, 42 Stat. 620.
7. Id.
8. id.
9. Act of August 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 203(b), 49 Stat. 684.
10. See Roberts, Monetary Policy - The Fed's Grip, 82 AFL-CIO AMERICAN
FEDERATIONIST February, 1975, at 19.
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the Fed more responsive to the federal government and the public
should be to shorten the terms of office of Board members from
fourteen to five years.1" In this way, the danger of the domination of
Board policy-making by an individual member or members will be
minimized. There will be increased opportunity for participation in
the activities of the Board, and impetus for closer cooperation with
the executive and legislative branches of government.
B. The Chairmanshipof the Federal Reserve Board
Under the 1913 Act, the President was empowered to designate
one member of the Board as Governor and another member as ViceGovernor. 12 No term of office was specified, but the practice was for
13
the President to make annual designations.
In 1935, an amendment to the Act was adopted which provided
that the heads of the twelve Federal Reserve District Banks (who
also termed themselves Governors) were to be called Presidents and
the seven appointees were to be known as the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. 14 Likewise, of the Governors thus
appointed, the 1935 amendment required the President to designate
one as Chairman and another as Vice-Chairman for four-year
15
terms.
The shortcomings of the amendment lie chiefly in its institutionalization of the isolation of the Federal Reserve Board from the rest
of the federal government. Almost all federal administrative
agencies permit a newly-elected President to select his own
Chairman. 16 The appointee may serve out his term in the agency but
must relinquish his Chairmanship if the incoming President so
desires. 17 While the term of the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Board is only four years, the Chairman does
not resign with the election of a new President nor is the Chairman's
term of office coterminous with that of the President. 8 As a result,
Presidents have been forced to deal with Chairmen who are not of
their own choosing. In an attempt to force the Federal Reserve
System to recognize a greater degree of accountability to the
President, Congress, and the general public, the term of office of the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman should be made to accord with that of
11. See Patman, The Federal Reserve System: A Brief for Legal Reform, 10 ST.
Louis U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1966).
12. Act of December 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 260.
13. Id.

14.
15.
16.
17.

Act of August 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 203(b), 49 Stat. 704.
Id.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 901-913 (1970).
Id.

18. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
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the President.' 9 In addition, there is currently no provision in the Act
for Senate confirmation of the Chairman. While it is highly unlikely
that confirmation would be denied a sitting Federal Reserve
Governor, nevertheless the post is so powerful and important that
the President's nomination should be submitted to the Senate for
confirmation.
C. Regional Federal Reserve Banks
One of the aspects of the Federal Reserve System most seriously
in need of reform is the composition of the Boards of Directors of the
regional Federal Reserve Banks. In the original bill, which was
eventually enacted as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Senator
Carter Glass of Virginia, then Chairman of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, provided that the twelve regional banks
would be operated by private corporations in which local banks
would hold stock. 20 Today, as stockholders, these local bankers
control the operations of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks.
They elect, subject to the approval of the Fed, six of each bank's nine
directors, leaving the Board to elect the other three. 21 These bankerselected directors then select one of their number as President for a
five-year term, subject to the approval of the Fed, and determine his
salary.2 2 A review of the salaries of the twelve Presidents of the
regional Federal Reserve Banks, as fixed by the local directors,
shows that the Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks receive far
higher salaries than members of the Board of Governors of the
23
Federal Reserve Board.
19. See Patman, supra note 11, at 324.
20. Act of December 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 4, 38 Stat. 260. Stock owned by member
banks "cannot be transferred or sold and is clearly a fixed-income, nonproprietary
asset." Patman, supra note 11, at 324.
21. 12 U.S.C. §§302, 304 (1970).
22. 12 U.S.C. §341 (1970).
23. Members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System receive an
annual salary of $52,500, and the Chairman $57,500. The Presidents of the regional
Federal Reserve Banks receive the following salaries:
Federal Reserve Bank
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Cleveland
Richmond
Atlanta
Chicago
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Dallas
San Francisco
Annual Report of the Federal Reserve System, 1976.

President'sSalary
$72,500
$97,500
$61,500
$68,000
$58,750
$74,000
$88,000
$66,000
$69,000
$55,000
$59,400
$90,000
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The dependence of regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents
upon local bankers for their jobs builds a conflict of interest into the
System which far outweighs the need for the presence and input of
the Bank Presidents on the powerful Federal Open Market
Committee. 24 The United States clearly should redeem the stock of
area banks in their local Federal Reserve Bank. Since the Federal
Reserve Banks are creatures of the United States, not of the private
banks in their local areas, the President should have the authority to
appoint Bank Presidents, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and Congress should be authorized to fix their salaries.
D. The Federal Open Market Committee
The Federal Open Market Committee, created by the Banking
Act of 1933,25 consists of the seven Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board and the twelve Presidents of the regional Federal Reserve
Banks. 26 All twelve Presidents attend the meetings of the Open
27
Market Committee, but only five vote.
The Federal Open Market Committee controls the national
economy primarily by instructing the New York Federal Reserve
Bank to buy or sell federal government securities on the open
market, depending on the desired monetary effect. 28 By buying
24. For a comprehensive study of this problem, see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS., FEDERAL RESERVE
DIRECTORS: A STUDY OF CORPORATE AND BANKING INFLUENCE (Comm. Print 1976).
25. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1970). The presence of the regional Bank Presidents on the
Federal Open Market Committee is currently being questioned on another ground in a
lawsuit brought against the Federal Reserve System by Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of
the House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, Reuss v. Balles, Civil No.
76-1142 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 1976). The action seeks to enjoin the twelve Bank
Presidents from "exercising the powers of officers of the United States as members of
the Federal Open Market Committee, on the ground that they have not been
appointed as officers of the United States in accordance with Article 2, Section 2 of
the Constitution." The action also seeks a judgment declaring section 12(A) of the
Federal Reserve Act unconstitutional (12 U.S.C. § 263(a)) insofar as it "provides for
membership on the Federal Open Market Committee of individuals who have not been
appointed as officers of the United States in accordance with the Constitution."
Complaint at 1, Reuss v. Balles, supra.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1970). When the Federal Reserve System was created,
President Wilson envisioned that the Federal Reserve Board would control the System
and that the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks would operate independently. See
Patman, supra note 11, at 304-05. The New York Federal Reserve Bank has always,
however, bought and sold securities for the accounts of all twelve Banks. Due to his
proximity to the New York money markets, the President of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank is the only permanent voting member on the Federal Open Market
Committee among the twelve Bank Presidents, leaving four voting positions to rotate
annually among the remaining eleven Bank Presidents.
28. 12 U.S.C. §§ 263(b), 353-59 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). "Open market operations
are the principal instrument used by the Federal Reserve to implement national
monetary policy." Roberts, supra note 10, at 20.
BANKING,
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United States securities, the Federal Open Market Committee adds
to reserves in the nation's banks, thereby increasing the amount of
money member banks can loan, while selling securities achieves the
opposite effect, decreasing the nation's money supply. 29 The Federal
Reserve Board's power over the economy also extends to its control
of the discount rate, the rate of interest a regional bank charges a
member bank which applies for a secured loan at its "discount"
window.30 In addition to establishing the discount rate, the Board

determines the amount of reserves a member bank must keep in its
local Federal Reserve Bank to secure its deposits. 31
The Federal Open Market Committee's use of these three
interlocking monetary tools ultimately determines the level of the
nation's money supply. 32 Since interest payments constitute perhaps
the principal cost of doing business in the United States today, the
Committee's control over interest rates gives it a life and death grip
on the nation's economy. Setting aside the question whether power
of this magnitude should be vested in a government committee
whose authority is unchecked by either the President or Congress,
the Federal Open Market Committee's methods of operation demand
immediate review.
One of the most objectionable aspects of the Federal Open
Market Committee is its proclivity for meeting in total secrecy from
29. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 21. See also Silk, A Factorin Economic Outlook:
Influence of the Durable Dr. Burns, N.Y. Times, February 28, 1977, at 39, col. 1.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 357 (1970). By raising the discount rate, bank borrowing to build
up cash reserves becomes more expensive. This discourages bank lending to private
borrowers, increases interest rates, and tightens the money supply. A lowering of the
discount rate encourages borrowing by making it profitable for private banks to
borrow from the Reserve Banks, build up cash reserves, and then lend money to
private borrowers at lower interest rates. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 20.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1970). Member banks of 'the Federal Reserve System are
required to maintain specified levels of cash reserves at their Federal Reserve District
Banks. Id. Raising reserve requirements forces private banks to put more cash into
the District Banks, which leads to a restriction on available credit and higher interest
rates. Conversely, to increase the availability of credit, the Fed may lower reserve
requirements. Banks then have more money to lend to private borrowers and interest
rates decline. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 19.
32. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 21. The nation's money supply can be measured
by two standards. The money in circulation and in checking accounts is known as M1, or "high-powered money." M-2 includes, in addition to M-1 money, all money in
time deposits or savings deposits. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 20. Economists
generally agree, however, that "M-1 is the measure most directly under the control of
the FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee], and that the money supply no matter
how defined will tend to move with rather than independently of M-1." Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 8 n.4, Reuss v. Balles, Civil No. 761142 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 1976).
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the President, Congress, and the public.3 3 The Committee publishes
three statistical releases concerning the results of Federal Open
Market Committee meetings one week after each meeting; these
reports - the Federal Reserve Statement, the Weekly Summary of
Banking and Credit Measures, and Money Stock Measures - are,
however, intelligible only to experts. 34 Furthermore, no transcripts
are made of Committee meetings. 35 Until recently, an enigmatic
summary of what the Committee said and did was issued approximately ninety days following a meeting, and an edited summary of
action taken was published five years later. 36 As a result of
improvements made during the 94th Congress, the enigmatic
summary is now made available approximately forty-five days after
an Open Market Committee meeting;3 7 in addition, Dr. Arthur F.
Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, now appears
regularly before the House and Senate Banking Committees as well
as the Joint Economic Committee to testify, albeit in a very general
way, as to the Federal Open Market Committee's current monetary
38
targets.
There is no excuse for denying the public an intelligible
transcript of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
The critical effect on the country at large of the monetary controls
exercised by the Committee far outweighs any argument that such
disclosure will be misinterpreted or that it will discourage the open
exchange of views at Federal Open Market Committee meetings.
Two dramatic examples of the consequences of permitting the
33. The Fed's refusal to make a transcript of Federal Open Market Committee
meetings is based on the typical bureaucratic argument:
If the FOMC memoranda of discussion were to be released prematurely, the
Committee would be faced with the choice of permitting a destructive diminution
of candor in its deliberations or of preserving the members' ability to speak their
minds freely and fully by terminating the preparation of such memoranda.
Letter from Arthur F. Burns to Wright Patman (June 3, 1975) (A copy of the letter is
on file at the Maryland Law Review).
Former Board member Sherman J. Maisel suggests that the Fed pursues its
policy of secrecy from "fear of political attack and public criticism and the belief that
political pressures would lead to more inflation." S. MAISEL, MANAGING THE DOLLAR
306 (1975).
34. See Letter from Arthur F. Burns to Wright Patman (June 3, 1975).
35. At present, the Fed uses a combination of note taking and tape recording at
Federal Open Market Committee meetings; these materials are destroyed as soon as
the statistical reports are prepared. See Letter of Arthur F. Burns to Wright Patman
(April 18, 1975) (A copy of this letter is on file at the Maryland Law Review).
36. 121 CONG. REC. H1774 (daily ed. March 14, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 271.5(a) (1976); see Merrill v. F.O.M.C., 413 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C.
1976).
38. H.R. Con. Res. 133, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. H995 (February 24,
1975).
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Committee to operate in secrecy involve the 1972 election and the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975.39 It has been suggested that, in an effort
to ensure the re-election of Richard Nixon, the Federal Open Market
Committee increased the money supply to 8.7 percent in 1971-72.4o
The discount rate decreased to 4.5 percent, the federal funds rate
ranged from 3.18 to 5.38 and the prime rate increased from 4.5 to 6
percent.41 This increase flooded the country with money, and Nixon
was re-elected. After the election, however, the Committee tightened
the money supply too sharply. The prime rate, which had been 6
percent at the end of 1971, was 12.25 percent on July 23, 1974; also in
1974, the discount rate ranged from 7.75 to 8 percent, and the federal
funds rate increased from 8.45 to 13.55 percent. 42 Needless to say, the
Federal Open Market Committee's manipulation of the money
supply to achieve political ends was not discovered until the
43
recession of 1974 was in full swing.
Similarly, in 1975, when Congress decided to stimulate economic
recovery by means of a tax cut and tax rebates, 44 the Federal Open
Market Committee under Dr. Burns raised the federal funds rate to
6.75 percent, thereby reducing the money supply to 2.05 percent and
effectively sabotaging the effect of the tax cut which Congress had
ordered. 45 As Wright Patman remarked to the House on October 31,
1975: "Of course we do not know what the members of the Open
Market Committee said, because Dr. Burns, despite my repeated
requests, has refused to make available a transcript of remarks made
39. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975)), provided for a reduction in 1975 income
taxes and a $22 billion cash rebate on 1974 taxes.
40. Sherman J. Maisel states that the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, George Shultz, informed the Board that "[i]f an election were to be won, the
Federal Reserve would have to increase the money supply at far more than the 4.2
percent average of 1969-70." MAISEL, supra note 33, at 268.
41. See 121 CONG. REC. H1774 (daily ed. Match 14, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman). There are three important interest rates: the discount rate, which is the rate
a regional Federal Reserve Bank charges a bank which applies at its discount window
for a secured loan; the federal funds rate, which is the rate a bank charges for loaning
excess reserves to another bank; and the prime rate, the rate of interest a commercial
bank charges its best customers. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 19-20.
42. See 121 CONG. REC. H1774 (daily ed. March 14, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
43. Since the edited transcripts do not appear until five years after Federal Open
Market Committee meetings, the reports for Committee meetings in 1971-72 did not
become available until 1976. See 121 CONG. REC. H1774 (daily ed. March 14, 1975)
(remarks of Rep. Wright Patman). See also Patman, What's Wrong with the Federal
Reserve and What to do About It, 61 A.B.A.J. 179, 184 (1975).
44. See note 38 supra.
45. See 121 CONG. REC. H10,539 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
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at the Open Market Committee meeting."4 6 Thus, during a period
when Congress was attempting to stimulate the national economy,
the secrecy under which the Federal Open Market Committee
operates permitted it to effectively destroy any hope for economic
recovery.
These are but two examples of the results of permitting the
Federal Open Market Committee to operate in secrecy. Full
disclosure should be required of a committee wielding such extensive
power over the economy, but it is especially vital so long as the builtin conflict of interest due to the presence of banker-selected Bank
Presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee continues.
E.

One Banking Agency

The foregoing discussion of the organizational and operational
shortcomings of the Federal Reserve System has focused on the
System's internal problems. Banking in the United States today,
however, involves not only the Federal Reserve System, but the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
At present, the responsibility for examining state and national
banks is divided among the three banking agencies. The Comptroller
of the Currency examines the national banks, 47 the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System regulate state member banks, 41 and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervises state nonmember
banks. 49 Bank holding companies as well as Edge Act and
Agreement corporations are regulated by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.5 0 Neither the Comptroller, the Federal
46. Id.
47. The Comptroller is authorized under 12 U.S.C. §481 (1970) to examine
national banks; the statute provides for two examinations per year, although the
Comptroller, in his discretion, may waive one such examination. Id.
48. State member banks are subject to examination by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System as a condition of membership under 12 U.S.C. §§ 325, 326
(1970).
49. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is authorized to examine state
nonmember banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a) (1970).
50. The Federal Reserve Board is given authority to examine bank holding
companies under 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1970). In addition, the Board is charged,
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 625 (1970), with examining Edge Act and state Agreement
corporations. Edge Act corporations are domestic businesses chartered by the Federal
Reserve System solely to conduct international banking and foreign investment
activities. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH
CONG., 2ND SESS., INTERNATIONAL BANKING: A SUPPLEMENT TO A COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE STUDY (Comm. Print 1976). They may not "carry on
any part of [their] business in the United States" except as "incidental to [their]

international or foreign business." 12 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
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Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation nor
state banking authorities have the power to examine all the banks.
Not long after the failure of the United States National Bank at
San Diego in 197351 and the Franklin National Bank in New York in
1974,52 Dr. Burns admitted to the American Bankers Association
that "some carelessness" had "crept into our banking system. ' 53 He
conceded that the three agencies have "overlapping regulatory
powers" which create "a jurisdictional tangle that boggles the mind"
and foster a "competition in laxity" which allows bankers to evade
regulation by playing off one agency against another.5 4 The result of
such confusion and overlapping authority among the bank regulatory agencies is that today there is no effective regulation of the
banking system. It is critical that there be a single banking
regulatory agency charged with the responsibility for examining all
banks, bank holding companies, Edge Act and Agreement corporations and their subsidiaries.
As to where such regulatory authority should be centered, the
Federal Reserve System has demonstrated small talent for effective
bank regulation.5 5 The Fed's deficiencies in the area of regulation
have been clearly evidenced not only by its handling of the Franklin
failure,5 6 but also in its routine approvals of bank holding company
acquisitions and bank holding company mergers.5 7 While the
51. See 121 CONG. REc. H6370 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
52. See 121 CONG. REC. H6370-71 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
53. Address by Dr. Arthur F. Burns to the American Bankers Association,
Honolulu, Hawaii, October, 1974.
54. Id.
55. If the Fed's demonstrated inability to regulate banks were not evidence
enough, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal of November 25, 1974 suggested an
additional reason against lodging comprehensive regulatory power with the Federal
Reserve. "[I]f regulatory authority is centralized, it had better be centralized
somewhere else than in the Fed. Combining the money-creation power with regulatory
authority creates a conflict of interest." Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1974, at 22, col. 1.
56. After studying the financial condition of Franklin National Bank for nearly
one year, the Fed publicly stated on May 1, 1975 that Franklin's holding company
would not be permitted to purchase the Talcott National Corporation. See 121 CONG.
REC. H6370-71 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright Patman). Yet despite
its knowledge of Franklin's weak condition, the Fed accepted the Comptroller's
declaration that Franklin was solvent and loaned it approximately $1.7 billion before
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sold Franklin's assets to the European
Bank and Trust Company in October. Id. The $1.7 billion was used to pay off banks
which had loaned Franklin upwards of $500 million in federal funds as well as
depositors in foreign branches whose deposits were not insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Id.
57. According to a study published on June 30,_1976 by Ralph Nader and
Jonathan Brown, the Fed approved 2,680 applications to establish or acquire
nonbank operations between January 1, 1971 and December 20, 1975. The study also
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Comptroller of the Currency also failed miserably in its regulation of
both the United States Bank at San Diego and the Franklin
National Bank, 58 the lack of effective regulation in each case was
essentially attributable to officials at the top of the bureaucracy.
Bank examiners, in reports as early as 1962, had warned top
Treasury officials that the United States National Bank in San
Diego was in trouble; 59 similarly, at the very time in May, 1974 when
the Comptroller was proclaiming Franklin's solvency, the bank
examiner assigned to the case was quoted to the effect that the bank
60
was insolvent.
In any event, whether we create a new National Banking
Commission or merge the three existing agencies into one, we
desperately need one agency charged with complete responsibility
for the examination and regulation of the nation's banks.
F.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has included proposals for reform, but
they bear reemphasis here.
1. The present staggered fourteen-year terms of office of Board
members should be reduced to five years, and the four-year term of
the Chairman of the Board should be made coterminous with that of
the President of the United States.
2. The United States should redeem the stock held by member
banks in the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. The President
should be given the authority, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to appoint Bank Presidents, and Congress should be
authorized to fix their salaries.
3. The Federal Open Market Committee should be compelled to
make full disclosure of all records of its meetings and other relevant
documents.
4. One federal agency should be vested with the authority to
examine all the nation's banks and banking organizations.
These reforms are urgently needed to remove the current conflict
of interest inherent in the Federal Reserve System and to strip its
indicates that the Federal Reserve Board approved new nonbank operations in 1974
for at least 17 of the 35 bank holding companies on its problem list. See Letter from
Ralph Nader to Senator William Proxmire (June 30, 1976) (A copy of this letter is on
file at the Maryland Law Review); see also R. Nader & J. Brown, Disclosure and Bank
Soundness: Non-Bank Activities of Bank Holding Companies (1976) (unpublished
study).
58. See 121 CONG. REC. H6370-71 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
59. Id.
60. Id. See also N.Y. Times, May 13, 1974, at 51, col. 3.
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operations of secrecy. 6' These mutually protective features have long
gone unchecked. Should they continue in effect, the problems of
bank holding company activity, the REIT industry, and foreign
lending can only worsen.
II.

THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY: SUCCESSOR OF
THE SECURITY AFFILIATE

The similarity between the security affiliate of the 1920's and the
modem bank holding company should give pause to banking
authorities who have permitted the bank holding company structure
to engulf the American banking system. One critic who witnessed
the abuses of the security affiliates and who foresaw similar abuses
in the bank holding company structure was the late Winthrop
Aldrich who in 1969, before Congress enacted the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1970,62 urged Wright Patman, then Chairman of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, "to stop the trend
toward mixing the business of commercial banking with all other
business." 63 Expressing his horror at the "growth of financial and
other conglomerates and the incredible proliferation of mergers
between completely unrelated types of business activity," Aldrich
commented that,
As one of the few men now alive who were involved in the events
which led to the decisions taken by Congress in the passage of
the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378, to divorce
commercial banking from all other business, I have been
tremendously concerned over the recent uncontrolled growth of
64
unregistered bank holding companies.
Aldrich recognized that the danger of the bank holding company
structure lies in its propensity for jeopardizing the stability of
affiliated banks. The strain placed on banks to support the parent
holding company's nonbank activities is the theme of the following
discussion. To explore it further, we turn first to an examination of
the security affiliates of the 1920's.
A.

The Security Affiliates of the 1920's

Aldrich saw the same evils in today's bank holding companies
that the Congress of 1933 saw in National City Bank's being allowed
61. These recommendations are supported by a recent study of the effectiveness of
the three banking agencies' supervision of state and national banks. See 1977
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS.

62. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
63. See Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1022 (1969).

64. Id.
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to engage in the investment banking business through its wholly
owned subsidiary, the National City Company.6 5 In 1911, Attorney
General George W. Wickersham and Solicitor General Frederick H.
Lehmann advised President William Howard Taft that it was illegal
for National City Bank, a national bank, to acquire the stock of
66
other national banks through the formation of a subsidiary.
President Taft's inquiry had been provoked by National City
Company's acquisition of $3,200,000 of stock in nonbanking corporations and substantial blocks of stock in some sixteen banks, nine of
them national banks.6 7 Condemning National City Company's
holding of the bank stock as a violation of federal banking law,
Lehmann argued that National City Bank's real purpose in forming
National City Company was not simply to control banks but to
engage in any business whatever, even that forbidden by its
charter.6 8 He cautioned:
If many enterprises and many banks are brought and bound
together in the nexus of a great holding corporation, the failure
of the one may involve all in a common disaster. And if the plan
should prosper, it would mean a union of power in the same
hands over industry, commerce and finance, with a resulting
power over public affairs, which was the gravamen of objection
69
to the United States Bank.
65. In 1931, a Senate subcommittee was authorized to investigate the activities of
the National City Bank and its security affiliates. The abuses which led to the
Congressional investigation ultimately resulted in the abolition of the security
affiliates under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. See Upshaw, Bank Affiliates and
Their Regulation: Part II, MONTHLY REV., FED. RES. BANK OF RICH. (April 1973), at 3.
66. See F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 80 (1939).
67. See Upshaw, Bank Affiliates and Their Regulation: Part I, MONTHLY REV.,
FED. RES. BANK OF RICH. (March 1973), at 15.
68. 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932). "The simple effect of allowing national banks to
organize affiliates ... was to defeat the purpose of the law in limiting their powers."
W. PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 52 (1941). Robert S.
Plotkin, a senior attorney with the Federal Reserve Board, has similar comments on
the successor of the security affiliate, the modern bank holding company.
What is the purpose of the one bank holding company? The expression most
commonly used by banks which have reorganized as one bank holding companies
is 'to provide operating flexibility.' What is that supposed to mean? When one
comes down to it, 'flexibility' in this context means 'to do things that a bank is
prohibited from doing by laws concerning banks.'
Plotkin, How the Supreme Court Viewed Bank Holding Companies, 62 BANKING
MAGAZINE 47 (1970). Furthermore, Plotkin asks,
Does it make any sense to prohibit interlocking directorships between member
banks in direct competition and permit such service between one bank holding
companies in control of such banks? Should a bank be prohibited from extending
loans on the security of its own stock, but be allowed to lend on shares of a
holding company whose sole asset is shares of the bank? Should a bank be
limited in the amount of loans it can make to its own officers, but be unrestricted
as to loans which it can make to officers of its parent one bank holding company?
Id.
69. 75 CONG. REC. 9904 (1932).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

President Taft allowed the creation of National City Company,
despite Lehmann's objections, after it sold all the shares of other
banks then held by it. National City Company was permitted to
retain, however, its $3,200,000 of nonbank stock. With this nonbank
stock in hand, National City Company soon became one of the
country's largest securities dealers, with Chase National Bank and
other large banks following National City Bank's lead in forming
security affiliates. 70 The banks gained entry into the securities
market by transferring their bond departments to their security
affiliates and purchasing nationwide investment banking firms. As
a result, National City Company acquired 50 branch offices, 11,000
miles of private wire and 89 foreign offices.7 1 When Chase Securities
bought Harris Forbes to become Chase Harris Forbes, it was the
''most extensive business of its kind in the United States" with
72
offices in fifty-three American cities and many offices abroad.
Testimony before the Senate Banking Committee revealed that,
in 1929, 151 national and 308 state banks had entered the securities
business as banks. In 1927, national bank affiliates had originated
only 10.1 percent of the nation's bond issues, whereas by 1930, they
originated 27.6 percent. 73 While commercial banks were originating
22 percent of bond issues in 1927, they originated 44.6 percent in
1930. Finally, private investment bankers who in 1927 had 78
percent of the securities market were originating only 55.4 percent in
1930. 7 4 State and national banks sold only 36.6 percent of the

nation's bonds in 1927, but were selling 61.2 percent in 1930. Private
investment bankers who had sold 63.2 percent in 1927 were selling
75
only 38.8 percent in 1930.

The banks saw in the securities business an opportunity to
expand into an entirely unregulated area as well as a chance to
engage in interstate or national enterprises which were forbidden to
them as national banks under the McFadden Act of 1927.76 Through
the formation of security affiliates, the banks quickly attained a
commanding position in the sale of securities in the United States,
but their rapid ascendancy was short-lived. The default of three bond
issues to Peru totalling $90 million, coming on the heels of the
collapse of the stock market in October, 1929, eventually led to a
70. See PEACH, supra note 68, at 64.
71. See id. at 89.
72. See id. at 95-97.
73. See Hearings on S. Res. 71 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess, 299 (1931).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 12 U.S.C. §24 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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Congressional investigation. 77 In 1927 and 1928, disregarding the
advice of its own experts that Peru was notoriously careless in the
fulfillment of its contractual obligations, that the interest on many
of its bonds had not been paid, and that its bad debt record made it
an extremely questionable moral and political risk, National City
Company floated the three issues to Peru. All three issues went into
default in 1931 and are not paid today. Commenting on the issue,
Ferdinand Pecora, the independent counsel who conducted the
Congressional investigation, stated:
The public never had a chance. The prospectus prepared for its
benefit contained an impressive list of the various Peruvian
governmental borrowings, but never even mentioned that there
had been a default on any of these debts. There was not one
syllable, not one hint of warning of the whole long series of
adverse circumstances, almost any one of which would have
78
frightened investors far, far away.
The Congressional investigation into the abuses of the security
affiliates in 1931 revealed "frozen loans converted into security
issues," affiliates used as "receptacles for bad bank loans,"
"unsound and speculative investments," prospectuses containing
"untruthful and misleading information," affiliates used "for the
personal profit of officers of the bank," "loans to officers and
directors without interest or collateral," astounding salaries and
bonuses paid to bank officers, and the "mixing of commercial and
investment banking functions. ' 79 Finally, in 1933, Congress, in the
face of another series of bank failures, the dissolution of two large
Michigan bank holding companies, and the report of the Senate
subcommittee investigating the activities of National City Bank and
its securities affiliate, passed the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibited banks from forming security affiliates. 80

77. See note 65 supra.
78. PECORA, supra note 66, at 102.
79. PEACH, supra note 68, at 113-14.
80. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Upshaw, supranote 65,
at 3. A similar pattern emerged in the context of the public utility holding companies,
which were abolished in 1935. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975). In 1932,
approximately thirteen companies controlled 75 percent of the privately owned public
utilities of the country. See Hearingson S. 1725 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935). These holding companies filed consolidated
returns in which each operating subsidiary was forced to pay what its federal taxes
would have been had each subsidiary paid taxes individually. Cities Service collected
eleven million dollars in this way, paying the federal government only $1.75 million
in taxes. Both the consumer and the govenment lost in this situation - the one by
paying higher utility rates, the other in lost tax revenues.
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The Bank Holding Company Structure Today

Currently, there are approximately 1,800 bank holding companies in the United States, with the 100 largest holding companies
controlling banks that hold at least 50 percent of all domestic bank
deposits.81 The growing realization that the development of the bank
holding company has weakened the soundness of the American
banking system demands a cold-eyed reassessment of the entire
bank holding company structure.
Theoretically, a bank holding company is an entirely separate
corporate entity from the bank or banks whose stock it holds, and
the failure of the holding company should not affect the stability of
the bank. Practical considerations, however, rule otherwise.8 2 When
a holding company fails, as was the case with the holding company
of the Beverly Hills National Bank, there is a run on the bank which
ends with its sale. Although the Beverly Hills bank itself was sound,
depositors became alarmed after learning of the instability of the
bank's holding company and withdrew their funds, causing the
83
bank to fail.

Bank holding companies frequently enter the banking business
by buying high interest loans from their banks, many of which are
made abroad, often with less-developed countries.8 4 Similarly,
when holding companies need to borrow money, they sell their
commercial paper to a bank owned by another bank holding
company. Since a bank holding company is not a bank, it may
engage in the banking business without regulation or safeguards;
there are few restrictions on what it can borrow or lend and to
whom. For example, with respect to the payment of dividends, while
a bank holding company needs dividends from its bank to show a
81. Statistics supplied by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D.C. (1976).
82. William Upshaw, formerly Vice President and General Counsel to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond points out that, even though separately incorporated, the
activities of the affiliate can adversely affect the parent bank:
1. By borrowing from the bank;
2. By selling securities to the bank or
another one of its affiliates;
3. By the parent bank's liberally lending
to customers of the affiliates;
4. By selling unprofitable securities to
customers of the bank;
5. By pushing sales of the bank's stock;
6. By assuming commitments less cautiously in
reliance on the bank or vice versa;
7. By not advising the trust department of the
bank of the securities held there.
Upshaw, (Part I), supra note 67, at 17.

83.

AMERICAN BANKER,

January 25, 1974, at 1.

84. See notes 122 to 137 and accompanying text infra.
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profit, it is sometimes cheaper to leave the dividends with the bank
to loan out at high interest and borrow to pay the dividends.
Although the legality of this practice is questionable, the Federal
Reserve System has not forbidden bank holding companies from
85
paying dividends when not earned.

Another practice common to bank holding companies is the
consolidation of the bank's balance sheet with that of the holding
company, allowing the holding company to deduct its losses against
the profits of the bank. In this way, bank holding companies are
encouraged to operate in debt. In addition to depriving the federal
government of tax revenues, the use of this tax loophole works to the
disadvantage of banks by jeopardizing the safety of their depositors'
6
funds.
The most alarming aspect of the bank holding company is,
however, its tendency to sap the strength and earnings of affiliated
banks through its attempts to protect the holding company
investment. Although banks held by a holding company are
forbidden to loan to the holding company under the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act,87 except on a secured
basis, the holding company encourages its affiliated banks to bolster
weak subsidiaries of the holding company with loans. A recent study
of twenty-three bank holding companies by Ralph Nader and
Jonathan Brown showed that the "expansion of non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies has substantially weakened the
soundness of the banking system."88 Nader and Brown lay part of
the blame for the situation on the leniency of the Federal Reserve
Board in permitting bank holding companies to establish or acquire
nonbank operations.8 9 Their conclusion is that the "large losses"
suffered by nonbank subsidiaries of these twenty-three bank holding
companies from such activities as "mortgage banking, leasing,
commercial factoring, and consumer finance" have seriously eroded
the stability of their affiliated banks. 90 The consequences can be
disastrous. When the Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga,
Tennessee collapsed last year, the failure was directly attributable to
the heavy loan losses it had acquired from one of its parent holding
85. 121 CONG. Rac. H1117-18 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
86. The treatment received by bank holding companies with respect to the filing
of consolidated returns can be contrasted with the treatment afforded real estate
investment trusts. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
87. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
88. See Letter from Ralph Nader to William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June 30, 1976).
89. Id.
90. See Nader & Brown, supra note 57, at 1.
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company's nonbank subsidiaries. 91 The real estate loans which
Hamilton National Bank was forced to pick up from its parent
holding company paid "neither interest nor principal and consti92
tuted a severe drain on the bank's earnings.
In response to the bank holding company problem, Professor
Roy A. Schotland has recently proposed that "Congress and the
Federal Reserve Board monitor specified major trends involving
'93
bank holding companies.
Such monitoring need not be exhaustive or burdensome ... but
unless basic trends are watched - as they have not been since
1970 - we do not know whether the framework Congress built to
separate banking from commerce and to assure that bank
holding companies benefit the public interest is a sound
94
structure or is being steadily eroded.
Although he believes that the bank holding company structure
renders "considerable public service, especially in reducing outmoded geographic limits on banking," 95 Schotland concedes that the
soundness of the American banking system has been sufficiently
threatened to warrant even his moderate proposals for the regulation
of the bank holding company structure. 96 Since Schotland's proposal
does not call for the regulation of a bank holding company's
nonbank activities, which include some of the system's most
potentially hazardous problems - e.g., mortgage banking, leasing,
commercial factoring and consumer finance - it would appear to be
an ineffective solution to the bank holding company dilemma.
It is clear that the only solution to the potential disaster towards
which the bank holding company structure is leading the American
banking establishment is the abolition of the entire structure. Until
Congress recognizes that it is the inherent structure of the bank
holding company which presents the danger to the stability of our
91. Bank analysts in New York said the action by the bank holding company
[declaring bankruptcy] wasn't a surprise after the failure of its flagship bank. One
specialist called the bankruptcy petition "a commentary on the severity of the real
estate loan market. They became too aggressive in lending to real estate
interests," he said.
Wall St. J., February 23, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
92. Comptroller of the Currency, News Release, February 16, 1976, at 3.
93. Schotland, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy Today, at 233
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banks, and that this inherent structure, despite Professor Schotland's recommendations, cannot be regulated, the stability of our
banks will be threatened. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
statement on public utility holding companies in 1935 is applicable
today to the bank holding company structure.
It is idle to talk of the continuation of holding companies on the
assumption that regulation can protect the public against them.
Regulation has small chance of ultimate success against the
kind of concentrated wealth and power which holding companies have shown the ability to acquire in the public utility field.
No government effort can be expected to carry out effective,
continuous, and intricate regulation of the kind of private
empires within the nation which
the holding company device
97
has proved capable of creating.
Any lesser solution than abolition will continue to expose banks
associated with holding companies to the instability to which bank
holding companies are prone as a result of their rapid growth and
diversification, and will inevitably lead to further bank failures. It is
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and ultimately other
banks which, in situations where banks fail, are forced to pay for the
irresponsible actions of private holding companies in attempting to
protect private investments with depositors' funds. Furthermore, a
correspondingly greater concentration of money assets in fewer
financial institutions and a lessening of competition in the banking
field are additional undesirable results of holding company-induced
bank failures.98 With the lesson of the security affiliates clearly in
97. Message of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Congress, March 12, 1935, reprinted
in Hearings on S. 1725 Before the Senate Comm. on InterstateCommerce, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1935).
98. According to statistics supplied by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D.C., 1976, there are 1,751 bank holding companies
today, a 4.7 percent increase in 1975 over 1,672 in 1974. (A copy of these statistics is on
file at the Maryland Law Review). Moreover, the growth of holding companies
appears to be faster than that of banking organizations, with 79 more holding
companies in 1975 as against 29 banking organizations - a continuation of the trend
to create holding companies around existing banks. Id. In eight states, the number of
holding companies decreased in 1975, in 26 states it remained the same, and in 17
states, the number of holding companies increased. Id.

Statistics also show that bank concentration is on the increase. In 20 states,
one bank holds over 20 percent of all deposits in commercial banks in the state; in 23
states, four banks hold over 50 percent of all deposits; and in 36 states, 10 banks hold
over 75 percent. Id.
A study in the January 1976 Federal Reserve Bulletin, defining bank
concentration as the "percentage of total domestic deposits held by the nation's 100
largest banking organizations," concludes that, because the percentage of domestic
deposits held by the 100 largest bank holding companies dropped from 49 to 47
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mind, and in view of the Fed's reluctance to regulate bank holding
company activity, Congress must act to abolish the bank holding
company structure to prevent the deterioration of the American
banking system.
III.

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FACING BANKS TODAY

The Fed's failure to effectively regulate banks is also apparent in
its acquiescence to the banks' involvement in REITs and foreign
loans in the early 1970's. The disastrous results of this involvement
for many of the largest American banks emphasize the Fed's
inability to see the long-range consequences of short-term profits.
A. Real Estate Investment Trusts
Created as Massachusetts Trusts, 99 REITs sell their shares to
the public through investment bankers who act as underwriters.1 00
The REITs avoid the double taxation to which ordinary corporations are subject by agreeing to distribute ninety percent of their
income each year to shareholders without writing off their losses
against their income.' 0 ' In this respect, REITs are much different
from bank holding companies, which can file a consolidated return
and write off their interest payments, business expenses and losses
10 2
against the income of the bank whose stock it holds.
REITs are created by promoters or banks. Upon organization,
the promoter or the bank contracts with the newly formed REIT to
act as its advisor and to manage its portfolio for a fee. In the case of
percent from 1968 to i973, bank holding companies are not increasing bank
concentration. Lawrence & Talley, An Assessment of Bank Holding Companies,FED.
RES. BULL. (Jan. 1976), at 19. This conclusion is suspect for three reasons. First, the
1976 statistics supplied by the Federal Reserve System disclose that in 1975 the
percentage of domestic deposits in the 100 largest banking organizations rose to 47.9,
showing that these top 100 bank holding companies then held approximately half the
nation's deposits. Secondly, measuring concentration by a percentage of domestic
bank balances in bank holding companies does not take into account other assets of
the holding company. Bank of America, Citicorp, and Chase Manhattan, for example,
not only have large balances abroad, but they own other companies of great value
and own stock in financial enterprises worldwide. Third, it is likely that different
results would flow were holding companies which do not rank in the top 100 included
in measuring bank concentration.
99. A Massachusetts Trust is defined as a "business corporation wherein property
is conveyed to trustees and managed for the benefit of holders of certificates like

corporate stock certificates."

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY

1127 (4th ed. 1951).

100. See Robertson, How the Bankers Got Trapped in the REIT Disaster, 91
FORTUNE

113, 113 (March 1975).

101. The Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960, 26 U.S.C. §§ 856, 857, 858 (1970)
was enacted as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 857 contains the tax provisions applicable to REITs.
102. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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some thirty-nine of the REITs (32.2 percent of the assets of the REIT
industry), 10 3 the trust was given the name of the bank acting as its
advisor. For example, Chase Manhattan National Bank organized
Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust as a Massachusetts
Trust and contracted to become its advisor. In this advisory
capacity, between June 1, 1970 and May 31, 1974, Chase Manhattan
National Bank received $19.9 million in fees, although the net
income of the REIT was only $59.6 million.10 4 The advisor fee
structure allows a fee to the advisor of the trust based on the
"income and asset size" of the REIT. 10 5 This gives the trust advisor a
"strong incentive to expand the size of the REIT as rapidly as
possible" and a "vested interest in the growth of the REIT."' 10 6
In Chase Manhattan's case, REIT involvement has been a
disastrous experience. In a desperate attempt to avoid default on
existing credit, Chase Manhattan has purchased "poor quality
assets from its REIT at over-valued prices" and extended additional
credit to the troubled subsidiary. 0 7 As of February 29, 1974, seventyone percent of the assets of Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty
Trust were on a nonaccrual basis.108 On September 30, 1974, in order
to obtain a $700 million credit at low interest for its REIT in an
arrangement with forty-one banks, Chase Manhattan was forced to
take $141.6 million of the loan.10 9 More recently, in September and
October, 1975, Chase Manhattan bought certain loans held by its
REIT "without recourse" for $161 million cash; $85.5 million of the
loans were on a nonaccrual basis. 1 0 In addition, the bank assumed
the commitment of its REIT to make some $30 million of new
construction loans. 1 ' In the fiscal year ending March 31, 1975,
Chase had also purchased $12.8 million in loans from its REIT." 2
Although REITs were organized on the naive assumption that
Chase Manhattan National Bank, for example, would have no
liability for the debts of its REIT, the realities of the situation dictate
otherwise. Banks such as Chase who have sponsored their own
REITs are obliged to maintain the stability of their REITs to protect
their own reputations; they accomplish this by extending additional
credit to the REITs from depositors' funds. Furthermore, the Federal
.103. See Nader, supra note 57, at 25 n.48.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

30.
28.
29.
36.
32.
34.
36.
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Reserve Board's authorization of banks to serve "as the advisory
company for a mortgage or a real estate investment trust" may well
have aggravated the REIT situation. 113 Instead of ruling that
managing a real estate investment trust was not "closely connected"
with banking and that the fee arrangement invites trouble, the
Federal Reserve Board amended Regulation Y to permit banks to act
as advisors to REITs without even applying to the Fed.11 4
The REIT crisis came to a head in December 1973 when the
Kassuba Development Corporation filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy
petition, adversely affecting the commercial paper market."15 First
Mortgage Investors, one of the five largest REITs, with seven
percent of its $672 million portfolio in loans to Kassuba, found itself
short of cash and unable to get bank credit."16 FMI's founder and
trustee, Jack Courshon, reportedly arranged a private meeting with
Dr. Burns, telling him that "if FMI went bankrupt, others would not
be far behind and that some banks might be pulled down in the
process."' 7 As a result, the Fed soon took steps to assure the REITs
more bank credit, pressuring banks to lend to the REITs."18
Eventually one hundred banks agreed to give FMI a $400 million
credit." 9 During this same period, Chase Manhattan Mortgage and
Realty obtained its $700 million credit, Continental Mortgage
Investors $531.8 million, Citizens and Southern Realty $329.6
million, Builders Investment $310.6 million, and Great American
Mortgage Investors $273 million. 120
113. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5) (1976), provides
that banks are within legal limits in
Acting as investment or financial adviser to the extent of (i) serving as the
advisory company for a mortgage or a real estate investment trust; (ii) serving as
investment adviser ...
to an investment company ...; (iii) providing portfolio
investment advice ... ; (iv) furnishing general economic information and advice,
general economic statistical forecasting services and industry studies, and (v)
providing financial advice to State and local governments ....
114. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1976).
115. See Robertson, supra note 100, at 115.
116. Id. at 169.
117. Id. Wyndham Robertson reports that
[i]n May, with many banks still resisting the revolving credit agreement, Jack
Courshon, wealthy founder and trustee of F.M.I. and a principal owner of its
advisory company, decided to carry his plea for help to the top. Through
Congressman Claude Pepper, an old friend and part owner of the advisory
company, he arranged a private audience with Arthur Bums. On May 21,
Courshon, Burns, Pepper, and Marx Leva, a Washington lawyer who is a former
Assistant Defense Secretary and a trustee of F.M.I., met, according to Courshon,
for "a good hour."

Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 168.

1977]

THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM

The banks' response to the recent collapse of the REIT industry
has been to renegotiate their bank loans on more lenient terms
rather than to declare defaults and attempt to foreclose on real estate
owned by the troubled REITs. 121 As a direct result of pressure by the
Federal Reserve Board, banks found themselves doubling their loans
and risk at the very time they should have been liquidating their
REIT loans and reorganizing the REITs in bankruptcy. Instead, by
1975 bankers had an exposure in the $22 billion REIT industry of
122
$11 billion.
Although it is understandable that banks which have created
REITs under their own names should wish to protect their
reputations by bailing out their REITs, the extension of additional
credit in such a situation merely aggravates the problem. The
tremendous outflow of assets (i.e., depositors' funds) which is
required to keep most REITs out of bankruptcy has placed an almost
insurmountable drain on the banks' assets. Before the situation
becomes more serious, REIT activity must be restricted and banks
must be forced to put their REITs into default. Without such action,
the banks' efforts to save face in the REIT market may cause the
collapse of the entire banking system.
B. Foreign Loans
The exposure of American commercial banks to default in loan
arrangements with less developed countries is undoubtedly the most
critical problem facing the American banking system today. While
the Federal Reserve has prime responsibility for a bank's foreign
operations, the Fed's regulatory philosophy has been "rather liberal
in the sense that it has permitted United States banks to engage in a
much broader range of operations overseas than are authorized in
the United States.' 1 23 As late as 1964, there were only eleven United
States banks with overseas branches. 124 By 1974, there were 125
banks with 732 overseas branches; 125 branch assets grew from $6.9
billion in 1964 to $155 billion in 1974.126 Each of the five largest

United States banks makes more than forty percent of its profits
from foreign operations, with Chase Manhattan now earning
sixty-four percent of its profits abroad in 1975 as compared with
121. See Nader & Brown, supra note 57, at 35.
122. See Robertson, supra note 100, at 113.
123. Debs, InternationalBanking, MONTHLY REV., FED. RES. BANK of N.Y. (June
1975) at 122.
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only twenty-two percent in 1970.127 Foreign earnings account for
sixty-two percent of Citibank's profits; of this sixty-two percent,

however, forty percent of Citibank's profits come from the under128
developed world.
It has been difficult to ascertain the amounts United States
banks have loaned abroad. A New York Times report broke down
United States loans to nine countries as follows:
Bank Lending Abroad129
(Loans by banks in the United States and their major foreign branches to
governments, banks and corporations in the designated countries as of June 30,
1976, in millions of dollars.)
Loans by
banks in U.S.

Loans by
branches abroad

Argentina
Brazil

1,348
3,931

Great Britain
Indonesia
Italy
Mexico
Peru
Philippines

5,822
288
624
4,695
853
693

856
7,101
35,837
1,694
5,033
6,876
817
1,365

South Korea

1,939

1,081

The report indicates that, as of July 1, 1976, "banks in the United
States and their major foreign branches had some $32.6 billion in
loans outstanding to five developing nations - Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Peru and Indonesia, all of which have been deserted as
heavy international borrowers with real or potential repayment
30
problems."1
The bonanza of bank lending to foreign governments began in
1970. During the boom, American banks furnished capital to the
world from their deposits or from money they hoped to buy at a
lower price than they were lending. Since the rates of interest were
higher in London than in the United States, these Eurodollar loans
127. See Rothschild, Banks: The Coming Crisis, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
May 27, 1976, at 17.
128. See Rose, Why They Call It 'FatCity, 91 FORTUNE 106, 107-08 (March 1975).
A more recent report states that Citibank receives more than 70% of its profits from
foreign earnings. Bennett, Mountains of Debt Pile Up as Banks Push Foreign Loans,
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977, §3 (Bus. & Finance), at 1, col. 3.
129. Crittenden, Loans to Developing Lands By U.S. Banks on Increase, N.Y.
Times, November 10, 1976, § D (Bus. & Finance) at 1, col. 5.
130. Id.
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to foreign countries were attractive investments. Experience in more
recent years has shown, however, that there are both advantages
and disadvantages to foreign financial operations. First, the
prospect of default on loan arrangements, especially with respect to
loans to less developed countries, is almost certain to materialize.
For example, for the past eighteen months, Zaire has been in default
on payment of principal and interest on its estimated $800 million of
outstanding bank indebtedness.'13 Recent efforts by government
creditors to stretch maturities and reduce repayments have collapsed. 132 Similar difficulties have arisen in connection with United
States bank loans to Peru, although an additional $210 million loan
was recently loaned to Peru in response to its request for aid in
paying off $318 million due on its foreign debt of reportedly $135
133
billion.
In the case of the Franklin National Bank, Franklin had bought
$14.5 million of Peru loans, one million from Wells Fargo's
syndicate, and $5 and $8.5 million from similar syndicates headed
by Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Morgan Guaranty, respectively.134 To date, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has
been unable to liquidate Franklin's total purchases of foreign loans
135
which approximated $500 million.
Secondly, while American banks operating in foreign money
markets are comparatively free from regulation and reserve
requirements, deposits in overseas branches are not insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.136 In the Franklin case, the
Federal Reserve, as lender of last resort, was forced to come to
131. Barron's, August 16, 1976.
132. Id. An agreement has reportedly been reached, however, in London between
Zaire and 13 agent banks representing over 100 lenders to put Zaire's debt and interest
payments on a current basis. The plan has four parts: payment of all interest arrears
(about $40 million); payment into a special fund of between $40 and $50 million to pay
all principal arrears by February 1977; negotiation by Zaire of a stand-by credit from
the International Monetary Fund; and fourth, a new $250 million loan from the
private banks. Stabler, Wall St. J., November 9, 1976, at 8, col. 2.
Another development in the Zaire situation is that both Citibank and Bankers
Trust Company have sued the Export-Import Bank in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York to prevent its setting up a preferential facility
under which Zaire would pay off its Export-Import Bank debts before loans by its
commercial bank creditors. Attacking the Ex-Im Bank: Who Should Get Paid First?,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (October 1976), at 48.
133. See Crittenden, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1976, at 29, col. 4; Oberdorfer,
Washington Post, August 29 and November 3, 1976.
134. Interview with Mr. Charles A. Holm, associate supervising liquidator with the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in New York City (Aug. 8, 1975).
135. Id.
136. Generally speaking, overseas deposits are not insured by the FDIC. But see 12
U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5) (1970).
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Frankin's aid by advancing Franklin over $1.7 billion to enable it to
pay off these foreign depositors and approximately 500 million of
1 37
federal funds.

The loans of United States banks to foreign countries now
exceed $32.6 billion and are increasing. 138 These loans involve
considerable risk and are properly within the province of investment
bankers or governments; commercial banks using depositor's funds
have no place in the area of foreign lending, especially loan
arrangements with politically and financially unstable governments. Furthermore, the practice of making loans to foreign
countries by private banks inevitably involves them in the
determination of international economic policy which is properly the
responsibility of governments, not banks or multinational corporations. Most significantly, the invasion of the long-term lending
market by commercial banks has destroyed the traditional sources of
capital for companies and governments. It has weakened the
American banking system by draining it of money that should never
have been frozen in such risky long-term ventures. Clearly, the time
has come for Congress to study the implications of these loans and
establish a national policy designed to restrict further loans to less
developed countries and to establish procedures for rescheduling and
eventual repayment.
CONCLUSION

The problems which confront the American banking system
today are many and serious. Some of the most pressing problems 137. 121 CONG. REC. H6370-71 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Wright
Patman).
138. Another aspect of the problem of foreign loans concerns the amount of money
which Middle Eastern oil exporting nations, including Iran, have on deposit in
American banks. These countries had $11 billion in deposits in American foreign
branches as of June 30, 1976, presumably in long-term certificates of deposit and $7.3
billion in short-term deposits in banks in the United States, totalling roughly $18.3
billion. Crittenden, Loans to Developing Lands By U.S. Banks on Increase, N.Y.
Times, November 10, 1976, § D (Bus. & Finance) at 1, col. 5. Testimony released by
the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee indicates that the major banks, supported by the Federal Reserve, are even
more sensitive about releasing information on these deposits than on their foreign
loans. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
ForeignRelations Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15 (1975). The ten largest banks
have successfully refused to comply with the Committee's request for information on
the loans and the deposits of their foreign branches, apparently fearing that these
countries will withdraw their massive deposits from the American banking system
should the banks release the information. The high degree of concentration of the
OPEC nations' funds in a handful of banks is cause for concern on the part of the
American banking community since the few American institutions handling these
massive loans and deposits would be totally vulnerable to a "sudden decision by the
Arabs to shift their funds." Id.
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abuses in the exercise of monetary controls by the Federal Reserve
System, the lack of effective bank regulation, the virtually unrestricted expansion of the bank holding company structure, the
collapse of the REIT industry, and most critical of all, the vast
exposure of United States banks to defaults on foreign loans - have
been summarized above. These problems are intimately related;
nearly all of them have occurred previously in our economic history,
have gone unchecked and have produced disastrous results. Yet
there is another connection, perhaps a more significant one for
modern purposes. All of these problems have developed to the crisis
stage as a result of the failure of the Federal Reserve System to hold
a tight rein on the American banking community's desire for profits
whether bank holding company, REIT, or foreign loan - at any
expense, even the collapse of the banking system. With members of
the Federal Open Market Committee dependent on local banking
interests for their positions, it is not surprising that national
monetary policy-making, conducted in the secrecy of the Open
Market Committee, has favored these interests. Therefore, before
any effective reforms can be implemented to deal with bank holding
company activity, the REIT industry, or foreign loans, the structure
of the Federal Reserve System must be altered to eliminate the
conflict of interest inherent in the presence of the regional Bank
Presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee. The restructuring of the Fed should follow the proposals suggested earlier in this
paper with regard to reducing the terms of office of Board members;
making the term of the Chairman coterminous with that of the
President; redemption by the United States of stock held by local
banks in their regional Federal Reserve Bank; authorizing the
appointment of the Bank Presidents by the President of the United
States; compelling full disclosure on the part of the Federal Open
Market Committee; and the formation of a single bank regulatory
agency with power to examine all banks. Only when these changes
have been made can the implementation of other reforms such as the
abolition of the bank holding company structure and the restriction
of REIT and foreign loan activity be effective in preventing any
further jeopardizing of the stability of the American banking
system.

